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A B S T R A C T  A R T I C L E   I N F O 
In the past decade formal corporate governance codes, laws 
and practices have started to focus on responsible board 
behavior and transparency in the boardroom. Negative board 
dynamics have been observed as contributing to business 
performance issues, damaging corporate behaviors and 
negative signals to stakeholders. This paper provides an 
integrated view on board dynamics combining the key 
theories and concepts from the practical corporate governance 
literature, the behavioral economics and the neurosciences 
fields into a comprehensive board dynamics framework. The 
aim is to help board members/advisors/governance 
committees to develop better board evaluation practices, by 
studying new evaluation techniques and theoretical insights 
into board dynamics. The  “fill-out-the-form” board 
evaluation practices are slowly changing and new trends aim 
to create long-term value from board governance. 
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1. THE EMERGENCE OF BOARD DYNAMICS AS A KEY CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE ELEMENT 
Well-known companies like, SNS Bank, DSB, ABN-Amro, Ahold, Rochdale or Vestia have 
been perceived successful in different industries, but they have a common feature. They 
provided big corporate governance scandals in the media in the last decade and called for 
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urgent corporate governance reforms in The Netherlands. The problem seems more universal 
with similar cases at Enron, Parmalat, Siemens, HP, Disney, Shell and Siemens. The issues of 
fraud, audit failure, accountancy scandal or the whistleblower CEO at Olympus (Woodford, 
2012) were just the start of governance failures. In the past few years corporate governance 
scandals have appeared all over the media and brought the attention to the possible 
dysfunction of companies’ boards itself. Were the non-executive board members doing their 
job properly? Did they follow the accepted standards of board operation? In most cases they 
did. Setting only strict rules of operation miserably failed, and a new perspective is needed on 
good board processes. It is not just about procedural rules, monitoring and regulations 
anymore; it is how we build high-functioning, critical and efficient working groups. (Clarke, 
2008; Lorsch, 2012). Good board dynamics cannot be legislated, but it can be built over time. 
By having an open and trustful atmosphere directors can fulfill their roles in a more efficient 
way without being trapped in a rigid position. While we have been used to building efficient 
groups within the hierarchical set up of companies, we have less experience in building these 
groups at the peak of the hierarchy (Charon, 2005). 
In the pre – Enron era, the world of corporate governance, board evaluations and addressing 
the issue of building a high-functioning, critical and efficient working board was hardly seen 
as an issue.  After the big corporate governance failures of the business world came into light 
like the Enron scandal in 2001, the issue of group dynamics did not appear as priority in 
corporate governance. Codes and roles described the most important ways of operating the 
board (task, responsibility, procedures, etc.), but the major emphasis was certainly not on the 
quality of interaction and the behavior of board members. However, more corporate 
governance failures made the shareholders and the public aware that codes, risk management 
did little to address the dysfunctional sides of board and more emphasis was put on more 
transparency and higher accountability within the organization. These two issues became the 
flagships for the post-Enron governance era and defined a new direction for corporate 
governance (Clarke, 2008). In 2009 an economic crisis with an almost meltdown of the 
financial sector shook the world and most blame was put on the acting CEOs and the 
regulators of the organizations, but the failure of the board as a whole remained largely 
unnoticed (Lorsch, 2009). As times changed the effectiveness of group dynamics in good 
governance of the organization became clear and more details appeared in the governance 
codes as well (Eenennaam van & Soesman, 2008). Having external legal pressure and more 
individual/collective responsibility, boards changed their role from passive to active, which 
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required changes also in board dynamics. Critical selection of new board members based on 
skills and diversity (more women, young people, and different cultural background), creating 
open atmosphere and yearly evaluation of the work became the new standard for good board 
dynamics (Lorsch, 2012).  
Board evaluation is mentioned as a corner stone of obtaining and creating good board 
dynamics which more governance codes have started incorporating it in a very detailed way 
(Laurens, 2009). Evaluating the board’ performance would include discussing the quality of 
board meetings, the credibility of reports, the degree of knowledge and interpersonal 
cohesion. By taking it a step further, individual directors should be evaluated based on their 
skills, resume, participation and effectiveness during meetings (Maanen van, 2010). The UK 
Governance Code (2008) was the first to describe that critical evaluation is needed on the 
individual level and an external facilitator could do an objective review in a more effective 
way. The Dutch Corporate Governance Code Monitor Committee from 2008 onwards gave 
more attention and guidelines to how evaluation should be done and the most recent “best 
practices” require annual reports on the used methods of board evaluation. At the moment 
The UK Governance Code is one of the most advanced, in terms of evaluation, and who 
should be responsible for the evaluation of whom. For instance the non-executive directors 
are responsible for the evaluation of the chairman. The Dutch code lets the companies decide 
who and how they should be evaluated. The UK code recommends a yearly board evaluation, 
with a minimum of external evaluation every three years.  From the Dutch codes only the 
“Code Banken (2010)” recommends that every three years an external facilitator should be 
invited for board analysis. An interesting contrast is the Swiss Corporate Governance Code 
(2008) as they mention board evaluation very briefly and besides a required annual evaluation 
there are no further guidelines mentioned. 
 
1.1. Boardroom dynamics: a framework 
Boardroom dynamics often reverts to as the whole spectrum of interactions between the 
members of a board. When one is thinking about the dynamics or interactions that are taking 
place among the individual board members in their different roles, tasks, meetings and 
settings, the richness of these interactions are plentiful. Analyses of the Bay of Pigs invasion 
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of 1963, the disaster with the Columbia Space Shuttle in 2003 among others have revealed 
whole layers and subtleties of groupthink in board situations. 
We take the perspective of the individual actor or board member as a starting point and then 
build forward. The individual board member has certain traits that make one act in a certain 
way in a specific board. The interaction with another individual board member adds to the 
dynamic of board. The (social) position, coalitions and the adherence to the norms within the 
overall makeup of the group of the board create a certain dynamic. The relationships with and 
influences of other stakeholders is the final level that determines the board dynamics.  
Interestingly enough the corporate governance literature that is strongly rooted in practice has 
developed some ways of dealing with these dynamics. We add what we consider key insights 
from behavioral economics to the four levels of interaction of which an individual board 
member is a part. Regarding the social sciences, we have taken the key insights from the field 
of neurosciences to construct the boardroom dynamics framework. 
The boardroom dynamics framework (Table 1.) summarizes the major insights on board 
dynamics from the corporate governance, behavioral economics and neuroscience literature. 
On each of the four levels of interaction, we have put the key insights and the key concepts of 
the three streams of literature in the framework.  For instance, on the personal level, the 
corporate governance literature provides key insights on individual decision making styles, 
how to deal with integrity and morality dilemmas and the issue of individual 
responsibility/accountability in a board. Key concepts in corporate governance literature 
include individual decision making (1) where the article of Frame (2012) on framing decision 
is our suggested reading, while on dealing with biases (2) in board decision making of 
Finkelstein et al. (2009), “Think again: Why Good Leaders make Bad Decisions and How to 
Keep it from Happening to You”, is a board room classic on the topic.  Dealing with dilemma 
and moral issues (3) Karssing (2011) is a key one for the Dutch boardroom setting, while 
accountability (4) appears in Roberts’ work (2005) a lot.  In the reference list you can find 
more corporate governance articles dealing with board dynamics at the personal level. Board 
roles and practices are discussed by Lorsch (2012) while looking at the development and 
challenges boards face in the 21st century. It is an important study as it describes the 
relationship and communication among the board members, and emphasizes the critical points 
of becoming a good board as a whole. Naturally, the government and external stakeholders 
also play a crucial role in corporate governance and the introduction of the governance codes 
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created a legal framework for companies both on industrial and national level as well. For 
example the “Code Banken” or “Zorgbrede Governance Code” were introduced by the 
financial and the healthcare sector to set specific governance standards for their own industry. 
Table 3. will provide more insights on evaluation in different corporate governance codes. 
The behavioral economics literature and research usually studies the social, emotional and 
cognitive factors on individual decision- making in terms of economics while looking at the 
possible consequences of those decisions. This theme on the personal level of board dynamics 
provides us with insights on how personal motives, personal risk-taking behavior, will power, 
judgment about certainty of outcomes plays a role. The Nobel prize winner, Kahnemann has 
done some excellent studies showing how personal motives, risk taking, judgment, will power 
all play a role in an overly positive risk taking or an overly controversial decision making 
process. These elements all belong to the so-called bounded rationality topic as a starting 
point for understanding behavioral economics. Taking a step further and looking at the group 
level the composition, the size and the selection of the board become crucial, as it defines 
what kind of board you want to be or could be in the future. The topic of board diversity 
provided an interesting research topic for many scholars as gender, age and cultural 
differences play an important role and their influence could not go unnoticed in the decision-
making process. Manzoni (2012) provides a very interesting view on boardroom conflicts and 
the reasons for a dysfunctional board. On the company level transparency and compliance 
with the codes are the key terms (Hermalin, 2007) for behavioral economics. The constant 
development of governance codes, and new rules for disclosure and reporting are trying to 
meet the demand for more transparent organizations, from the internal and external 
stakeholders’ side as well. 
Neuroscience is a scientific study of the neurological system that collaborates a lot with other 
fields like philosophy or psychology. Social neuroscience is one of the most well known 
branches to the wider public as it describes how biological systems affect social processes and 
behavior. As scholars realized the important effects of psychology on boardroom 
interaction/intervention there is more and more attention given to neuroscience in terms of 
boardroom dynamics. Basic human needs define personal attitude in individual decision-
making (Meche, van der, 2012), while the level of trust, the willingness to be part of a group, 
the power relations and conflict situations affect interpersonal relations. On the next level, the 
aim for social cohesion and coalition- building in important questions is very strong among 
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the board members. It defines how important board members could be in the decision-making 
process and how the power game is played among them. In addition to that, as van Maanen 
(2012) describes groupthink and pecking order (who is the real leader) could change board 
dynamics into a negative direction as it takes over individual decision-making. In terms of 
external relations, there is a strong pressure on the board to demonstrate uniformity and well-
functioning presence to avoid any kind of negative signaling to shareholders, which could be 
harmful to the company’s image.  
 
The importance of reviewing boardroom dynamics and how the board functions could be 
nicely explained by an empirical study called the “Wet Monkey Theory” by Albert Einstein. 
In this experiment they choose a group of monkeys who are allowed to take a banana in the 
first round. However, in the second and the third round they made the monkeys wet when 
they were going to pick a banana. Afterwards as a result, none of the monkeys wanted to have 
the fruit. Then they added new monkeys to the group and the newcomers followed the 
behavior of the old monkeys without any explanation. The basic idea of this experiment is 
interpreted in board dynamics, as new members of the group face set rules and informal ways 
of doing the work, and they accept it without actually getting an explanation. These norms 
and behavior are not always the most suitable; therefore, a critical view on the board process 
is needed by doing constant evaluation. 
1.2. Board dynamics from different perspectives 
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Table 1:  Different perspectives on board dynamics 
 
 
Corporate 
Governance 
 
Key 
concepts 
 
Behavioral 
Economics 
 
Key 
concepts 
 
Neuroscience 
 
Key 
concepts 
 
Group level 
including 
external 
stakeholders 
The way companies 
accept and interpret 
governance codes 
while filling in a 
socially responsible 
role in the society. 
- Governance 
codes both on  
national and 
industrial level 
 
External and 
internal 
stakeholders 
demand more 
transparency 
from the 
companies, 
while the 
government sets 
new rules for 
disclosure and 
reporting. 
-Regulatory 
framework 
- Transparen  
(Hermalin) 
From this perspective it  
important 
to understand what kind  
signals 
the company is willing t  
send to the 
external world. 
-Uniformity pre  
-Positive signal  
(Lorsch) 
 
Board level 
On this level 
board’s role and the 
issue of collective 
responsibility/accou
ntability is 
described while 
taking ethical 
business behavior 
into account in the 
decision-making 
process. 
- Business 
ethics 
(Karssing) 
- Collective 
Accountability
/ 
Responsibility 
(Roberts) 
- Board’s role 
(Lorsch) 
 
 
It describes the 
way of selecting 
board members, 
diversity within 
the group, the 
features of 
different board 
sizes and the 
task division in 
the boardroom. 
- Board 
selection 
- Board 
diversity 
(Manzoni) 
- Board 
size 
(Maanen, 
van) 
On the group level 
the issue of 
groupthink and how 
the individual could 
be part of the group 
appears. The use of 
pecking order and the 
start of coalition 
building describes 
this level the most. 
- Coalition 
building 
- Pecking 
order 
(Manzoni) 
- Social 
cohesion 
- Groupthink 
(Maanen, 
van) 
 
Interpersonal 
level 
The relationship 
and level of 
communication 
among the board 
members and with 
the management 
board (special 
attention to CEO 
and the Chairman). 
- Relationship 
and 
communicatio
n 
(Lorsch) 
The status quo 
and the 
bargaining 
power of the 
individual 
directors or 
smaller groups 
within the board 
could influence 
the decision-
making process. 
- 
Bargaining 
- Status 
quo 
(Diamond) 
On the interpersonal 
level the most 
common human 
interactions could be 
described like the 
issue of trust, power 
relations among 
board members and 
conflict management. 
- Trust 
(Kahnemann
) 
- Power 
relations 
- Conflict 
(Pick) 
 
Personal level 
Individual decision-
making process in 
terms of integrity 
and morality and 
the question of 
individual 
responsibility 
/accountability from 
a board member’s 
perspective. 
- Individual 
responsibility 
(Frame) 
- Integrity 
- Morality 
(Karssing) 
- 
Accountability 
 
The personal 
motives, risk-
taking behavior, 
the willpower of 
the individual 
and how board 
members judge 
certain decision 
outcomes play 
an important 
role here. 
- Personal 
motives 
- 
Willpower 
- Judgment 
- Risk-
taking 
(Kahnema
nn) 
It relates to all kind of 
basic human needs 
that an individual can 
experience as part of 
bigger group and how 
it affects the behavior 
of the board 
members. 
- Basis 
human 
needs 
(Meche, van 
der) 
- 
Neuroscience 
(Nobel) 
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One of the most important challenges boards face is to prevent governance failures in the 
organizations they govern. The four major categories of problems that are primary subjects to 
board`s attention: strategic, control, ethical and interpersonal relationships. While the first two 
refer to performance failures, the latter two describe negative board dynamics (Maanen van, 
2012). A board evaluation could be an effective internal tool to help prevent them from 
occurring both on an individual and at board level and stated as a primary condition for 
quality improvement in the boardroom (NKCC, 2013).  
What are the advantages of having board evaluation in terms of changing the way board 
members work? First of all, it provides a formal feedback moment where uncomfortable 
topics could be discussed in a very detailed way without exceeding the limits of acceptable 
social behavior. In addition to that, new board members could receive immediate information 
on board processes, expected culture and dynamics during their term. Moreover, an 
evaluation can bring attention to bad routines and poor personal performance that takes place 
within the boardroom (Maanen van & Veltrop, 2010). Naturally, board members mention 
some negative effects of evaluation. They claim that it can change the pleasant working 
atmosphere in the group or it could be too confronting for certain colleagues. Board members 
who are serving on the board for a long time might not be open to criticism or evaluation that 
could lead to governance failures (Maanen van & Veltrop, 2010). Therefore, regular 
evaluations need to be conducted even if the cohesion of the board will be in danger. 
 
 
What will be 
evaluated?
Who will be 
evaluated?
How often 
should  
evaluation 
be done?
Who will be 
asked?
What 
techniques 
will be 
used?
Who will do 
the 
evaluation?
What will 
be done 
with the 
results?
 
Who is the 
assignment 
provider? 
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Figure 1.: Board evaluation circle 
Board evaluation could be requested from both the internal and the external stakeholders’ 
side. On one side, governance codes require annual board evaluation in most countries and 
companies must comply with this external regulation. Government is the most powerful 
external stakeholder in that matter and it influences the frequency and process of board 
evaluation. On the other side, unsatisfied investors are the most common internal assignment 
providers and their main concern lies on effectiveness and decision-making abilities of the 
board. In case of serious personal and professional issues within the boardroom, the Chairman 
is allowed to ask for board evaluation as well. The nature of the assignment provider already 
gives the direction of the evaluation, the techniques that will be used and defines if internal or 
external evaluator is needed (Deloitte, 2012). 
The Board evaluation circle (Figure 1.) describes the seven main questions board evaluation 
should address (Kiel, 2005), as they could bring attention to negative board dynamics or 
confirm the existing good framework. As a start it is important to define what will be 
evaluated (Maanen van & Veltrop, 2010). Is the motivation to show corporate leadership or to 
resolve problems? The board should discuss and agree on the objectives of board evaluation, 
while specific objectives to review is best delegated to small groups or individuals. The most 
common goals include clarifying any potential problems, identifying the root of these 
problems or testing the practicality of existing solutions. Besides choosing the objective of the 
evaluation, it is necessary to define the skill set of the people who will be evaluated. It could 
mean talking about the board as a whole, individual directors or key governance personnel. 
The principle is to find all participants with a major impact on the reviewed objective while 
taking cost-and time implications into account. For developing a shared understanding of 
governance roles and responsibilities a group evaluation is the most suitable, but it has limited 
insight into performance problems. To identify strengths/weaknesses and to analyze particular 
issues in depth, individual evaluation should be considered (Minichilli et. al, 2007). However, 
it carries the danger of being too subjective on matters of personal contribution and 
performance. Peer evaluations could provide a more objective review on individual 
performance and can identify skill gaps in a more detailed way. 
Usually the facilitator decides if the scope of the evaluation is internal or external (Kiel, 
2005). Internal evaluation involves the board members, the CEO, senior management and 
other employees of the organization. By having external evaluations stakeholder’ s 
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perspective and issues can be brought to the board’s attention. This could include evaluating 
customer/supplier relationship, shareholders and financial markets or governmental relations. 
After choosing the scope of analysis the facilitator will decide on who will conduct the 
evaluations. There is a possibility to appoint an internal evaluator like the chairman, a non-
executive director or a board committee. This scenario has the advantage to demonstrate 
authority to external stakeholders and to help establishing standards/ culture of performance 
within the boardroom. In addition, it is a very cost-effective option and confidential 
information could be kept within the organization. However, it brings up the question of 
transparency, internal biases and proper disclosure and if the internal evaluator has the 
necessary skills and time to conduct the analysis (Institute of Directors). On the other hand, 
appointing an external consultant would be useful in case of board incapability and lack of 
transparency within the organization. An external could play a mediator / messenger role and 
recommend different approaches, framework or perspectives. It is highly advised to use an 
external evaluator in case of difficult issues, in times of major reorganization or if the 
individual director evaluation is done for the first time. The higher level of technical skills and 
independence could compensate for the high costs of involving an external consultant.  
There are different techniques available for conducting board evaluations. Most of the time 
the results of the analysis will determine the most suitable method of evaluation. Qualitative 
data is best used to find roots of the problems or getting detailed information on a certain 
subject. It provides in-depth knowledge about certain issues, but it could be easily biased and 
it requires judgment on the part of person undertaking the review. The most common ways of 
collecting qualitative data is individual in-depth interview, focus group interview, 
observation, case studies and company documentation. Martin Hilb (2006) introduced a 
standardized board interview situation with a set of cards as a support tool. The set of red 
cards helps to indicate which corporate governance factors are the most important for the 
board member and the green cards help to rank the satisfaction with those governance 
practices. Afterwards, the main reason for dissatisfaction at each highlighted issue is explored 
and an action plan is developed to change those practices (Hilb, 2006). For analyzing board 
dynamics, observation and focus group interviews are used most of the time. These provide 
insight, with the help of group interaction, and are the most effective ways of seeing board 
members in action. However, they are not really suitable for discussing sensitive issues and it 
is subject to an observer’s bias. Case studies are time consuming, but can dive into specific 
areas unique to the organization.  
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On the contrary, quantitative data is very specific and measureable and could help in 
comparing board member performance with one another. Usually, the facilitator decides on 
the timing of the survey and it is used in conjunction with other techniques. It is subject to 
individuals’ subjective assessment of certain issues and carries the danger of responder bias. 
Online questionnaires can gain large amount of information in a short time and the data could 
be easily compared and comprehended. Surveys are usually standardized, but there is a 
possibility for including open questions to capture individual opinion and needs. This type of 
survey is called the semi-standardized survey (Hilb, 2006). However, board members might 
dislike questionnaires and it is not suitable for analyzing sensitive issues (Deloitte, 2012). The 
“8 W” concept developed by Martin Hilb (2006) is a successful board evaluation tool 
regarding board dynamics. On one side, it analyzes issues related to board policies e.g. board 
guidelines, board culture, board structure, board meeting management and board diversity. On 
the other side it pays attention to other important board factors like board champions, board 
stakeholders and board feedback. The self and external evaluation is done both on the 
individual board member’s level and on the joint board level as well. Besides having 
individual feedback the board is responsible for its own self-review, the so-called 360 
feedback process. The main aim of the “8W” evaluation technique is to find out which factors 
are the most important for the board’s success and how satisfactory those requirements are at 
the moment.  
Different psychological tests could be used during the evaluation process to measure 
personality styles and psychological preferences. The Myers-Biggs Type Indicator (MBTI) 
analyzes the preferences how people perceive the world and make decisions in general (The 
Myers & Briggs, 2013). For individual evaluation the Cognitive Profile Inventory is also used 
as it could help to identify people’s own cognitive styles and to predict behavior with regard 
to thinking, learning and problem-solving (The Myers & Briggs, 2013). On the interpersonal 
and group level usually the intensity of interaction among board members and conflict 
management within the board is evaluated. The FIRO test (Fundamental interpersonal 
relations orientation) helps to analyze the level of affection, inclusion from the board 
member’s side, while finding out which individuals have remarkable control in the group 
(FIRO-B, 2012). Conflict management depends a lot on the member’s conflict style and their 
responses in a complex situation. The Thomas-Kilmann conflict mode instrument measures 
the individual’s response to conflict situations by working along the axes of assertiveness and 
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cooperativeness (Thomas & Kilmann, 2013). Usually in case of external evaluation these tests 
are used as consultants could choose the most suitable ones for certain boards.  
After the evaluation is completed, the question is to whom the results should be released. It 
could be board members (evaluation focused on board dynamics), chairperson/board member 
(individual director performance) or senior management team (board-management 
relationships). If the board is seeking performance improvement internal stakeholders should 
be informed, while for building up a reputation for transparency could be best done by 
involving external stakeholders as well. An interesting discussion remains about the role of 
the CEO and to what extend he/she should be an active participant during the whole process. 
There is an ongoing discussion on how often board evaluation should be done. Boards with 
clearly articulated and understood policy are conducting it on an “as needed” basis, but it is 
not a common example. Some organizations prefer extensive evaluations every 2-3 years 
done by an external facilitator (Code Banken, 2010). The disadvantage of this type of 
evaluation that many changes could occur during this time frame; therefore, solutions to 
certain problems could be delayed. The annual review is most used by board members as it 
connects evaluation to strategy formulation processes time-wise. However, this could become 
too complacent and predictable for boards and that could outweigh the advantages of the 
evaluation. For the future boards many scholars recommend an ongoing process as it 
evaluates the effectiveness of each board meeting. The advantage of using this method is 
“front of mind” issues, quick feedback, little time / effort needed and encouraged discussion 
and interaction from the board members’ side.  
It is interesting to see what is happening after the self-evaluation procedure is done, what are 
the actual changes boards make. There is an annual survey done by PWC trying to summarize 
actions taken by boards after the yearly evaluation (PWC, 2013). According to their survey 
57% of the boards took some actions and seeking additional expertise was the most common 
one (35%). They realized the importance of the committee’s composition and boards make 
regular changes in the committee’s structure as well (30%). Diversifying the board has an 
increasing number (17%) as more female and international members are welcomed on the 
boards. Changing the whole board’s structure is less common than changing the committees 
(14%), but not re-nominating a director could be one of the actions taken. The relationship 
between the management and the board could be improved as well (12%) by changing the 
dynamics and communication between them. On the individual board member level extra 
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counseling and trainings are provided after the evaluation (12%) to improve their 
performance. Naturally more actions could be taken, but these actions are the most common 
ones according to the survey. 43% of the boards felt that there is no need to make any changes 
after the self-evaluation process.  
By looking at the above-described evaluation circle (Figure 1.) and its main elements, a 
distinction could be made between advanced/least advanced governance codes in terms of 
evaluation. The national corporate governance codes give a good indication how developed 
the board evaluations are in a certain country. Table 2. (Evaluation in corporate governance 
codes) highlights the most important aspects of evaluation mentioned in the following codes: 
Dutch Corporate Governance Code (2009), Code Banken (2010), Gedragscode voor 
Commissarissen en Toezichthouders (2009) from The Netherlands, The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (2012), Guidance on Board Effectiveness (2011), UK Stewardship Code 
(2010), the Swiss Corporate Governance Code (2008), the Swedish Corporate Governance 
Code (2010) and the OECD principles on Corporate Governance (2004). The comparison 
helps to identify the differences in terms of business culture and how soft control instruments 
are used during the evaluation procss (Luckerath-Rovers, 2011). It seems that the frequency 
of the evaluation and the members being evaluated is standard in most codes, but the other 
elements differ by country. While the British and the Dutch Code find it important to discuss 
the method of the evaluation and allow internal/external evaluation, the Swedish Code 
focuses more on who should be evaluated and what happens with the results.  
External evaluation as an important element of transparency and corporate governance is only 
required by The UK Code and the Code Banken in The Netherlands. It is interesting to see 
that the Swiss Code only mentions evaluation very briefly and it does not specify any 
requirements for the evaluation. The Guidance on Board effectiveness developed by the 
British Financial Reporting Council follows exactly the guidelines of the UK Code, while the 
UK Stewardship Code complements the UK Code and gives more governance guidelines to 
institutional investors. The OECD principles are currently under review, as they try to 
strengthen the core values based on experiences from the past 10 years. 
In 2014 a new initiative has been taken in The United Kingdom to set general standards for 
board evaluation. This proposed Code of Practice along with a framework would provide a 
better overview on how board evaluations should be done and how companies and advisers 
could work together more effectively. Key features of this proposed code are: clarity on 
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conflicts of interest, safeguards against insider trading, not more than two consecutive 
assignments for consultants, creation of independent adviser body and more focus on 
effective communication between client and adviser (Medland, 2014). The draft code has 
been developed for external evaluation by Advanced Boardroom Excellence consultancy, but 
the internal evaluation part is still open to public discussion. This draft is focusing on the 
competencies and capabilities of the consultant, the expectations of the client by the 
consultant, the terms of engagement and on creating an effective evaluation process (ABE, 
2014)  
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Table 2.: Evaluation in corporate governance codes 
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Corporate 
Governan
ce Code 
 
OECD 
Principles 
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Corporate 
Governan
 
 
Financial 
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Council 
Guidance 
on board 
 
Evaluation at 
least once a 
year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Internal/extern
al evaluation is 
allowed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Board and 
individual 
board 
members must 
be evaluated as 
well 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Evaluation of 
board 
member’s 
skills and 
competencies 
 
 
 
 
      
The 
process/metho
d of evaluation 
must be 
reported 
 
 
 
 
      
The 
organization 
can decide on 
the method of 
evaluation 
 
 
 
 
      
At least every 
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external 
evaluation  
 
 
  
 
     
Non-executive 
directors 
should 
evaluate the 
chairman 
        
Evaluation 
should be sent 
to the 
nomination 
committee 
        
CEO should be 
continuously 
evaluated 
        
Executive 
management is 
not allowed to 
be present 
during the 
evaluation 
meeting 
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Board dynamics and evaluation are more and more important at the governance table and 
companies integrate the corporate code guidelines into their day-to-day management (Hilb, 
2006; Maanen van, 2012; Luckerath-Rovers, 2011). It is a developing field and multiple 
instruments have been introduced to create effective decision-making in the boardroom. Many 
governance codes follow the example set by the UK Corporate Governance Code as it gives 
the most detailed description on role/responsibility of the directors and how evaluation should 
be done. For example in The Netherlands most of the required governance conditions are 
fulfilled, but there is still remarkable management involvement during the evaluation process 
and it is mostly done without the help of an external facilitator (Monitoring Commissie, 
2012). However, this change is not only challenging for the policy makers, but also for the 
board members. How are the most important issues brought to the table? Which design should 
be used for evaluation and which board member is the weakest link in the boardroom? These 
are some issues every board is facing today, but finding the right instruments to solve these 
problems differs by company. The direction is given for good board dynamics, but the way to 
achieve this goal is still unclear. Changing the way of group interaction and having a critical 
view on their own functioning requires willingness for change and a new mindset from the 
directors’ side, so hopefully at the end not the Enron board members will be the smartest guys 
in the room. 
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